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Information technology is developing rapidly, especially in the field of computer 
science, telecommunications and information systems. In the early days of 
telecommunications, voice networks could not be combined with data networks. 
However, more recently it became possible to integrate data, audio and video services 
onto a single network, known as a multimedia network. The capabilities of the Internet 
are also rapidly increasing, and now, in addition to data packets (email, web browsing) 
the Internet transfers audio and video packets. 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a multimedia service. This technology 
can be used to transmit audio, video, and data packets. Consequently, it is becoming the 
most preferred communications technology. VoIP will eventually replace the use of 
traditional telephony – Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN), although the 
switchover process is challenging. A chief concern it that, while PSTN transmits audio 
packets over a closed network, VoIP sends audio packets using an open network – the 
Internet. In PSTN, eavesdroppers must have direct access to physical network to obtain 
information from communications. Whereas with VoIP, eavesdroppers can monitor data 
packets from they are connected to the Internet. Hence, security and privacy are 
important considerations when switching to VoIP systems. One solution is anonymous 
systems, which can be used to implement security and privacy protocols. However, this 
typically reduces the Quality of Service (QoS) of the VoIP. 
This empirical research study examines VoIP performance in an anonymous 
network – The Onion Routing (Tor). Two scenarios are implemented using the real Tor 
network to investigate three QoS metrics for VoIP: latency, jitter and packet loss.  As 
recommended, latency in VoIP should be less than 400 ms, jitter should be less than 50 
ms and packet loss should not be more than 5%. In addition, the research calculates the 





Experiments were conducted in reference to two scenarios. The first scenario is 
VoIP calls routed through a Tor network with three Tor relays (default Tor). And the 
second scenario is VoIP calls routed through a Tor network with two Tor relays. 
Experiments were performed in three periods; December 2012, July 2013, and October 
2013. During each experimental time period, a hundred calls were captured for each 
scenario. Experimental results show that the QoS of VoIP over the two Tor relays was 
better than the VoIP over the three Tor relays. However, a probability of attackers 
calculation found that the VoIP with three Tor relays returned better anonymity than 
that with two Tor relays. 
The best results were returned over the experimental period in July 2013, when 
the acceptable calls using two Tor relays reached 64 calls at 5% packet loss. 
Meanwhile, the worst experimental results were returned in October 2013, when 
acceptable calls numbered 11 using three Tor relays at 1% packet loss. At the end of 
2013, the actual data for relay numbers and bandwidth approached forecast result with 
time series analysis. Meanwhile, the numbers of Tor users differed from the Tor users 
forecast. In August 2013, Tor users increased dramatically; this is attributed to the fact 
that BotNet attack was using the Tor network to attack their target leading to a fivefold 
increase.  
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Computer science and information systems are increasingly being utilised. 
Therefore, it is also a very active area of research. An important technology that 
relates computer science and information systems is the Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP). This technology supports the transference of voice, data, and images through 
packet-switched networks (Internet Protocol), and has provided significant changes to 
communications worldwide. Cost saving, enhanced functionality and ease of 
maintenance, are the principle reasons why VoIP has been among the most popular 
telecommunication technology growth areas. It is especially valuable for its utility 
supporting long distance communication and internal corporate networks. A 
corporation can increase its efficiency by combining voice and data networks in a 
single network. 
However, incorporating VoIP has more attendant security risks than traditional 
communications because the voice packets are sent through an open and independent 
network, i.e. the Internet. Therefore, there is a need for those offering VoIP 
applications to provide users with greater insurance of privacy. As VoIP is a real-time 
technology multimedia application, it demands a good Quality of Services (QoS), that 
is a latency less than 400 ms, to provide acceptable performance. Providing user 
privacy in VoIP technology required that the voice packets be routed through a 
suitable anonymity system. However, the added cryptographic computations and 
random rerouting which guarantees the efficacy of anonymity systems, introduces 
delays. 
This explains why the process of switching from Public Switched Telephone 
Networks (PSTN) to VoIP signifies a new data security challenge. Unlike PSTN, 
wherein the telephony networks are isolated from data networks and the Internet, the 
majority of VoIP communications are transferred over the public network – the 
Internet and so may easily become exposed to security threats, especially when the 




In PSTN, eavesdropping usually requires direct access to tap a line or 
penetrate a switch. Thus, the intruder’s risk of being discovered may increase when 
attempting physical access. In contrast, in VoIP, the opportunities for eavesdropping 
are tremendously greater, as it can be achieved simply by observing the different 
nodes on a packet network [2]. 
1.1 Research Problem 
There have been many researches focused on VoIP security; for example 
adding encryption [3, 4], and steganography [5, 6] to VoIP communication to protect 
the message communicated between the sender and receiver. However, encryption 
techniques are as yet unable to conceal information about the caller and callee 
identity.  
Nowadays, additional privacy techniques are needed with VoIP 
communication; to help to protect information shared between the caller and callee, 
and to insure it is not possible to discover who is calling to whom. However, 
combining security and privacy options together in a VoIP communication network 
increases end-to-end delays; thereby, degrading the quality of service (QoS).  
In VoIP, guaranteeing privacy over an anonymity network is difficult to 
implement. Although there are many low latency networks, these are generally not 
designed to transfer real-time communications such as VoIP applications. Many 
anonymity networks are based on TCP streaming. Unlike VoIP, this transfers audio 
packets in the form RTP packet over an UDP based stream. 
This research is based on an empirical model. The model and experiment are 
designed to transfer VoIP over an anonymous network – the Tor network. The main 
purpose of this research is then to investigate predictions of QoS performance in 
anonymity VoIP over an existing anonymous system – The Onion Routing (Tor). In 
other words, this research studies the feasibility of implementing VoIP over the Tor 
network and also focuses on Tor network forecasting. QoS performance analysis will 
be conducted to determine the advantages and the drawbacks of the Tor network as a 





1.2 Summary of Research Question 
Four fundamental research questions are asked in this research: 
• Question 1: How is the VoIP network integrated with an anonymous network – 
the Onion Routing (Tor) network? 
Tor is a low latency anonymous network. It is only capable of transferring data 
packets, based on the TCP stream protocol. Voice packets usually use RTP, and are 
transferred with a UDP stream. Because VoIP uses a UDP stream, the Tor network 
cannot directly transfer voice packets onto it.  There are several options available for 
transmitting voice packets through the Tor network. This research will discuss how 
best to integrate VoIP with the Tor network in chapter 3. 
• Question 2: How are QoS performances affected by anonymising VoIP over the 
Tor network? 
The original Tor network uses three relays, located between the sender and 
receiver. These are an entry relay, a middle relay and an exit relay. In implementation, 
although the Tor network is a low latency anonymous network, there is no guarantee 
that any data packet can be transferred with a latency of less than 1 second.  
Latency is one of factors to consider when sending voice packets over the Tor 
network. This is a sensitive issue on VoIP, and based on ITU recommendations, end-
to-end or one-way latency on VoIP should not exceed 400 ms. Therefore, this 
research modifies Tor relay use, so that it is shorter than that of the original Tor 
network. Besides this, using two relays results in a lower latency than using three 
relays. 
Comparing QoS performances in VoIP using three or two Tor relays is 
discussed in chapter 4. Increasing QoS performances relative to the reduction of 
anonymity in the Tor network, is covered in relation to research question 3.  
• Question 3: What is the difference in the probability of attackers afforded by the 




Differences in the number of relays used on the Tor network can cause a 
reduction in the anonymity. In other words, anonymity increases as more relays are 
used in the connection; however, the performance may decrease due to the path length 
of data connection. In this research, anonymity is based on the probability of 
attackers. In chapters 2 and 4, the details of probability of attackers are presented in 
relation to the number of relays and the path length of the Tor network connection. 
• Question 4: Can the Tor network capabilities be predicted for the future to 
support VoIP systems? 
 Chapter 4 also discusses predictions about Tor network conditions. A time 
series analysis applying four trends related methods are used to forecast the progress 
on the Tor network in the future. Thus, the growth of the Tor network can be 
predicted, as can the ability of the Tor network to transfer VoIP calls.  
1.3 Contributions  
This research will make three contributions. First, it evaluates the performance 
of VoIP through an anonymous network – The Onion Routing (Tor) [7]. Second, it 
predicts the growth of users, bandwidth and relays in the Tor network using the time 
series analysis method. Third, it present the anonymity of the Tor network, based on 
the probability of attackers, as it related to the number of Tor relays and the path 
length of the Tor network. 
1.4 Dissertation Structure 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follow. In section 2, we 
provide an overview of the literature review on VoIP technology, anonymous system 
relevant to this study, the current attack on Tor, and related works. In section 3, we 
describe the research method used, which is discusses the research approach, research 
design, instruments, data collection procedures, and data analysis procedures. The 
results and analysis from the experiments are given in section 4. Finally, section 5 
presents the conclusions, discussion, and generalizes the results and outlines the 





2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents the literature review and introduces VoIP architecture in 
anonymous network systems, including VoIP protocol, voice codec and QoS metrics. 
The chapter also introduces anonymous network systems, and the forecasting network 
method. 
2.1 VoIP Protocol 
At the present time, there are two common standards for signalling and 
controlling VoIP or Internet telephone calls; these are H.323 and Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP). Both were developed in 1995 and were solutions for researchers when 
initiating communication between two computers in order to transfer voice and video 
media streams [8]. International Telecommunication Union (ITU) published the first 
H.323 standard in early 1996 and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
published the SIP standard in draft form in 1996. H.323 provides specific QoS 
parameters, such as low end-to-end latency and packet loss, meanwhile SIP considers 
security [2, 9]. This research focuses on SIP, as this will be used in the experiments. 
Figure 2.1 presents general VoIP architecture with two computers and one VoIP 
server. 
 
Figure 2.1 VoIP Architecture 
2.1.1 H.323 
In early 1996, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) published 
H.323. It is designed to work with local and wide area networks with guaranteed QoS. 




over an IP network. The H.323 protocol support Secured Real-Time Protocol (SRTP) 
and Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY). SRTP acquires media confidentiality, 
while MIKEY is used for authentication (key exchange) [10] 
The components in H.323 standard are Terminals, Gateways, Multipoint 
Control Unit (MCU), and Gatekeepers. Terminals are the end-user devices; these can 
be IP phones, softphones or Computer or smartphones. VoIP devices or terminals 
require a system control unit, media transport, media transmission, and packet-based 
network interface. Gateways are devices that handle communication between 
different networks with protocol translation and media conversion. The MCU handles 
conferencing with three or more terminals in a multipoint conference. The Gatekeeper 
manages a zone that includes terminal, gateways, and MCU. It is responsible for call 
routing and address resolution.  It may also provide call control signaling, call 
authorisation, bandwidth management, and call management. 
Implementing security in H.323 protocol is a complicated process. Using 
random ports in the H.323 protocol causes a security problem that effects firewalls. 
Since ports required for H.323 are not set, filtering the firewalls should open possible 
ports. Consequently, this condition will provide an opportunity for an attacker. The 
other problem in H.323 is Network Address Translation (NAT), because the IP and 
the port on the H.323 IP header do not match the NAT. 
The H.235 standard [11] provides security for the H.323. Many security 
issues, such as, authentication, integrity, privacy and non-repudiation have been 
addressed in the H.235 standard. H.323 can also use a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) for 
transport layer security [11, 12]. Figure 2.2 presents signalling stack of H.323 and 
SIP. 
 





2.1.2 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application-layer signalling protocol, 
developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in RFC 3261. It is used to 
setup, maintain, revise and control the multimedia communication for application 
layer. The protocol is well designed for easy implementation, ability and flexibility 
[13]. The primary function of SIP is session initiation, relying on RTP for media 
transfer [14].  
Transport Layer security (TLS) is used to secure SIP hop-by-hop [15]. In hop-
by-hop security, it is assumed that the caller and callee trust all proxy servers 
connecting them to inspect the message bodies in their message. End-to-End security 
in a SIP is obtained by Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). The 
caller and callee do not trust proxy servers to check their message [16]. 
Three main components of the SIP system are User Agent (UA), servers, and 
Location Services (LS).  
A user agent can be a SIP phone or SIP client software used from a computer 
or a mobile phone. It creates a SIP request to establish communication with other user 
agents and sends and receives packets (either video packets or audio packets). User 
Agent Client (UAC) and User Agent Server (UAS) are part of User Agents (UA). The 
responsibility of UAC is to initiate a request by sending a message INVITE to the 
intended recipient, while UAS must receive a request and generate responses to 
request that have been received [17].  
There are three type of servers in a SIP system; namely: proxy server, redirect 
server, and registrar server. In the implementation, a SIP system requires all servers 
implement Transport Layer Security (TLS), and may also implement IPSec or other 
lower-layer security protocols [13].  A proxy server receives SIP requests from UA 
or another proxy server and then forwards a request to the destination. It is also 
responsible for user authentication and charging or billing for a SIP-Based VoIP 
network [18]. A redirect server maintains the database of SIP users. It supports user 
mobility as it is responsible for responding to requests associated with destination 




updates the user’s location. A location service maintains the location database for 
registered UAs. It contains information about users, such as URIs, IP addresses, 
scripts, features and other preferences. Commonly, three servers  are installed on a 
single SIP server. 
There are three SIP routing methods [19]. The first method is a direct 
connection between caller and callee. When making a call, this method does not 
require a SIP proxy or VoIP provider. The identity of the SIP client is detailed in the 
IP address, allowing the caller would to dial IP address to communicate with the 
callee. This method is generally used on a homogeneous network, in which the caller 
and callee are on the same network such as a LAN, WAN or VPN. Figure 2.3 shows a 
SIP message transaction between caller and callee. 
 
Figure 2.3 SIP method 1 
The second method takes place during call setup; the caller communicates 
with the SIP proxy, which uses Location Services (LS) (integrated with the SIP 
server) to determine where the call should be routed. Then, the caller receives a 
message “302 Moved” from the SIP Server. After the above session, the SIP message 
exchanged in the second method is same as in the first method. 
In the third method, the SIP proxy interacts with the location service to 
forward an INVITE message from caller to callee. In this case, the SIP proxy is 
responsible for determining the route from caller to callee. Once the caller and callee 
are connected, the entire packet voice is transferred through the SIP proxy. Typically, 
the third method is used on a heterogeneous network, in which the caller and callee 
are on a different network, sip proxy, or VoIP provider. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 describe 






Figure 2.4 SIP method 2 
 
Figure 2.5 SIP method 3 
The SIP request-response method is designed in the same way as Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) method. The SIP request message is described in table 2.1, 
and the SIP request is replied to with one of six SIP responses codes, as shown in 
table 2.2. 
Table 2.1 SIP Request [20] 
SIP Request Description 
INVITE Initiates a call signalling sequence 
ACK Confirms that the client has received a final response to an invitation 
OPTIONS Provides capabilities information, such as voice bit rates supported 
BYE Terminates a session / release a call 
CANCEL Cancel a pending request 









Table 2.2 SIP Responses Codes [13] 
SIP Responses 
Codes Description 
1xx Provisional – request received, continuing to process the request 
2xx Success – the action was successfully received, understood, and accepted 
3xx Redirection – further action needs to be taken in order to complete the request 
4xx Client error – the request contains bad syntax or cannot be fulfilled at this server 
5xx Server error – the server failed to fulfill an apparently valid request 
6xx Global failure – the request cannot be fulfilled at any server 
2.1.3 Real Time Protocol (RTP) 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) developed a Real Time Protocol 
(RTP) in 1993 and first published this in 1996 as Request for comments (RFC) 1889; 
in 2003, this was superseded by RFC 3550. RTP is a common Internet application 
protocol, providing end-to-end network transport functionality, which supports 
interactive multimedia or transmission of real-time data such as telephone and video 
teleconferencing, and television services over multicast or unicast network service 
[21]. Two-way phone calls are multicast audio; therefore, RTP can be used for IP 
telephony or VoIP. In many applications, RTP is used with TCP, but not in VoIP, as 
RTP provides end-to-end streaming and delivery services over UDP [20]. 
RTP comprises two parts; these are the data and control part. The data parts 
are Real Time Protocol (RTP) and the control parts are Real Time Control Protocol 
(RTCP). The RTP conveys data with real-time properties. It includes timing 
reconstruction, loss detection, security, and content identification. Meanwhile, RTCP 
is mainly used to monitor the quality of services (QoS), to deliver information about 
the participants in on-going sessions and to manage synchronisation. It provides 
support for applications, such as real-time communications. Source identification, 
multicast-to-unicast translators, and different media stream synchronisation are 
supported by RTCP [21]. 
RTP provides services which include payload type identification, sequence 





defines the type of RTP payload or indicates the kind of content being carried. Some 
payload type is static and can only be used for identification type; however, in a 
newer version, it can also be dynamic and used to assign a control protocol, such as 
payload type in SIP. Sequence numbering is used to synchronise a packet to sender 
and receiver. Sequence numbering is mainly used to detect losses or out-of-sequence 
packets. Sequence numbers increase by one for each RTP packet transmitted. Time 
stamping refers to the presentation time of the content being carried by the Protocol 
Data Unit (PDU). It is used to place incoming video or audio packets in the correct 
temporal order. It is most useful for video, but is also used for voice sampling rate. 
Time stamps increase in accordance with the time packet sent. Delivery monitoring – 
Clients (caller and callee) send Real Time Control Protocol (RTCP) packets in an 
RTP session to determine quality and network conditions if there are RTP packets, 
which are lost or contain errors.  
There are five types of RTCP messages that RTP generates to report on the 
RTP session; these are, firstly: Sender report containing statistics from active 
senders, it can include transmission and reception statistics. Then Receiver Report, 
which is the statistical report received from those conference participants who are not 
the active sender. Afterwards, Source description, which contains information about 
the RTP source, including Domain Name Services (DNS) name. Bye, which is used 
to end a RTCP session. Lastly, Application Specific containing additionally 
information that the application would agree to share [20]. 
The Secured Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is a security profile for 
RTP and RTCP. It aims to provide confidentiality, message authentication, and reply 
protection to clear text RTP traffic [22, 23]. 
2.1.4 User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [24] and the Transport Transmission 
Protocol (TCP) [25] are the main Internet transport protocols. In 1980, David P. Reed 
designed UDP and defined RFC 768. UDP is a connectionless service that provides 
application-level procedures and an unreliable Internet transport protocol that sends 




absence of a sending rate control. In addition, it is a simple protocol using minimal 
overheads, and hence data can be sent immediately [26]. Therefore, UDP has a low 
latency compared to TCP. 
UDP is basically an application interface for IP [27]. It does not perform 
handshaking mechanism in the same way TCP does and it is focused purely on 
transmission. The purpose of UDP is to break upstream into a datagram, add a source 
and destination port information, a length, and a checksum. There are four UDP 
datagram fields: source port, destination port, length, and checksum. 
 
Figure 2.6 UDP header and Data 
Source port indicates the sending port number used when sending any reply 
back to the source. The Destination port indicates a specific port of application 
services, such as port 53 for Domain Name Service (DNS). Length is the length of a 
datagram in bytes, including header and data. Checksum, UDP checksum is same 
algorithm as the IP checksum. It is provided as data integrity with minimal protection 
against transmission error. A Checksum in UDP is optional; if the UDP header does 
not use a checksum then the checksum should be set at 0. Figure 2.6 shows UDP 
header with data. 
2.1.5 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [25] is defined in RFC 793 from 
1981, and provides highly end-to-end reliable connection in packet-switched 
computer communication networks. It employs flow control concerned with the user 
capability and congestion control that monitors capacity on the network [26]. TCP 
delivers data packets in order and ensures data is received completely at the receiver. 





There are some features of TCP that effect those applications that use it [25, 
27]:  
Stream data transfer, TCP transfers a contiguous stream of bytes over a 
network. It groups data into TCP segments and transfers them to the destination 
through IP layer. Reliability, TCP uses a sequence number to assign each transmitted 
byte. Sender sends ACK to the destination and waits for a reply from the destination, 
if reply ACK is not received within a timeout interval, then the data from the sender is 
retransmitted. To avoid duplicate packets the TCP receiver rearranges the packet 
based on sequence number. Flow control, receiver TCP sends a reply ACK to sender, 
the receiver notifies the sender of the number of bytes that can be received without 
causing any problem (overrun and overflow) to the internal buffer. Multiplexing is 
allows multiple many processes within a single host to use TCP communication 
facilities simultaneously. TCP provides a set of addresses or ports within each host. A 
Logical connection is a combination of status information for each data stream, 
which includes sockets, sequence number, and windows size information. Full 
Duplex, TCP provides simultaneous data streams in both directions (sender to 
receiver or vice versa). 
The three-way handshake is a method of TCP used to establish a connection 
between two participants.  SYN, SYN-ACK and ACK are three packets on an 
established connection process. Host A (sender) sends TCP SYN packet to Host B 
(receiver). Host B receives Host A’s SYN; then replies with TCP SYN-ACK packet. 
Host A receives Host B’s SYN-ACK, then it sends ACK to Host B, then Host B 
replies with ACK after receiving an ACK packet from Host A. Finally, a TCP socket 
connection between Host A and Host B is established. Details of a TCP three-way 
handshake exchange are described in figure 2.7. 
TCP protocol is unsuitable for data packets with delay sensitivity because TCP 
uses a three-way handshake to establish a connection between participants, and if 






Figure 2.7 TCP three-way handshake 
2.2 Voice Codec (Coder-Decoder) 
In telecommunications technology, codec is an abbreviation for coder/decoder. 
It is a device or computer software component that compresses or converts analogue 
voice signals to digital data and vice versa. The purpose of codec is to reduce or 
compress the file size, so that it can be transferred faster and does not take up a large 
amount of disk space. 
Nowadays, many of the codecs developed are suitable for VoIP, such as 
G.711, G.729, G.726, Speex and iLBC. In this research, we focus on one codec; the 
Internet Low Bit Rate Codec (iLBC). In 2004, the iLBC was a narrowband speech 
codec developed by Global IP Solutions (GIPS). It was a freeware codec with limited 
commercial value. Since 2011, iLBC has been acquired by Google.inc, and since then 
free software has been offered freely as open source.  It is appropriate for VoIP 
applications, streaming audio, archival and messaging [28]. iLBC uses speech signals 
sampled at 8 kHz with frame lengths of 30 ms at 13.3 Kbps and 20 ms at 15.2 Kbps. 
The iLBC algorithm deploys with controlled responses to packet losses. The 
iLBC codec enables graceful speech quality degradation when packet loss or delays 
occur in network connections. In addition, the iLBC codec delivers a better 
performance than ITU codecs such as G.729A and G.723.1. The results of iLBC 






Figure 2.8  Performance (Mean Opinion Score (MOS)) comparison of iLBC, 
G.729 and G.723.1 [29] 
2.3 Quality of Services of VoIP 
Voice quality is very sensitive to three key performance criteria on the packet 
network. These are all common QoS factors measured in relation to networks, 
namely: latency, jitter and packet loss [30]. In 2003, the International 
Telecommunication Union - Telecommunication (ITU-T) announced 
recommendation G.114, for one-way transmission time. ITU-T recommends up to 
250 ms one-way latency for interactive communications. Delays between 150 ms and 
400 ms continue to be acceptable for long distance communications such as Berlin – 
Germany to New York – United States [31-33]. Moreover, average one-way jitter 
should be less than 30 ms [34, 35], and packet loss can be up to 5% [36, 37]. 
2.3.1 Latency 
Latency (end-to-end) is the total time required by data packets or voice 
packets to reach their destination. There are several factors causing high latency in a 
network, such as distance from source to destination and the bandwidth of the 
network. Total latency or end-to-end latency includes propagation delay, transmission 
delay, queuing delay, codec processing delay, packetisation/depacketisation delay, 





Table 2.3 ITU-T G.114 recommendation – propagation delay [33] 






Terrestrial coaxial cable or radio-relay 
system: FDM and digital transmission 4 µs/km Allows for delay in 
repeaters and 
regenerators 
Optical fibre cable system, digital 
transmission 5 µs/km 
Submarine coaxial cable system 6 µs/km 
Submarine optical fibre system:  
Worst case Transmit terminal 13 ms 
Receiver terminal 10 ms 
Satellite system:  
Propagation through 
space only (between 
earth stations) 
400 km altitude 12 ms 
14000 km altitude 100 ms 
36000 km altitude 260 ms 
Propagation delay or media latency is the time taken to transfer a data packet 
from source to destination using media transmission. This depends on the link length 
(the physical distance of the communications path) and the propagation speed over 
the specific medium such coaxial cable (4 µs/km); optical fibre cable (5 µs/km) or 
satellite system (12 ms on 400 km altitude) [33]. Table 2.3 presents the one-way 
propagation delay in ITU-T G.114 recommendation. 
Transmission delay is the time required to put all packets’ bits into a link or 
network and is known as packetisation delay. It has nothing to do with the distance 
between sender and receiver. Queuing delay is the time spent by a packet in queues 
at  input and output ports prior to processing. In other words, it is caused by queuing 
packets during the transferring process and is mainly due to congestion in the 
network. The Codec processing delay consists of codec’s algorithmic delay and 
look-ahead delay. This delay is the time required for compressing and converting an 
analogue signal to a digital one. Play-out buffer delay is the time taken to reach the 
play-out buffer at the receiver end. 
In the implementation, there are two ways to determine the end-to-end latency 
of the network. The first is by measuring the transference time of data by sending a 
packet and then waiting for a response from the destination. This is called round trip 





from the source until the source receives a response from the destination. End-to-end 
latency is obtained by the following equation: 
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦!"#!!"!!"# = 𝑅𝑇𝑇/2 (1) 
The second approach is by capturing the sending time and receiving time at 
the source and destination. In this way, the time at source and destination must be 
synchronised; due to the accurate time at both places proper latency will be obtained. 
The end-to-end latency can be obtained as: 
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦!"#!!"!!"# = 𝑅! − 𝑆! (2) 
2.3.2 Jitter 
Jitter is the variation in time between packets sent and packet arrival, it is  
caused by the difficulties that exist in a network such as the distance between sender 
and recipient, bandwidth and route changes.  Jitter is a key measure of QoS in VoIP 
networks. According to Tim Szigeti, average one-way jitter should be less than 30 ms 
[34]. In the study one-way jitter is measured according to jitter calculation in 
Wireshark using the equation below: 
𝐷! = 𝑅! − 𝑅 !!! − 𝑆! − 𝑆!!!  (3) 
then, 
𝐽! = 𝐽!!! +
!! !!!!!
!"
  (4) 
where, 
𝐷! = D𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦  𝑜𝑓  𝑛  𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡   𝑚𝑠 ;   
𝑆! = 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑛  𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡(𝑚𝑠); 
𝑅! = 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑛  𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡  (𝑚𝑠);  




2.3.3 Packet Loss 
Packet Loss is when packets arrive too late or do not arrive for processing at 
the destination [37]. Packet loss can be caused by many different factors such as 
overloaded links, physical media errors, low link quality and others. Voice quality 
lead to problems when packet loss exceeds 5% of the total packet [38]. 
 In the case of a voice packet, packet loss is said to occur when the voice 
packets arrive at the destination exceeding the recommended maximum latency of 
400 ms. Percentages of packet loss are calculated by dividing the number of packets 
lost with the total number of packets. An acceptable quality call is one that meets the 
recommendations of QoS. 
2.4 Anonymous Systems 
Pfitzmann and Kohntop introduced the most common definition of anonymity 
in an information community, in their paper [39] “Anonymity of a subject means that 
a subject is not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.”  
One of the advantages of an anonymous communication is for hiding 
information; it can be used to hide information about who is calling whom. 
Anonymous communication may conceal the identity of the caller or callee and the 
network address (relationship), such as the IP address from unauthorised surveillance. 
There are three types of anonymity, namely sender anonymity, receiver 
anonymity and relationship anonymity. Sender anonymity is when information about 
the sender is hidden but that of the receiver may not be. Receiver anonymity is when 
information about the receiver is hidden. Relationship anonymity, also called unlink-
ability, is when the connection between the sender and the receiver cannot be tracked 
or identified. Even where information about sender and receiver is known, the fact 
that they are communicating with each other cannot be detected [40].  
Privacy protection in SIP is divided into four classes: (1) where the caller’s 
absolute anonymity, the identity of the caller is hidden to all network components 





eponymity only to the callee – the identity of the caller is hidden to the callee, (3) 
where the caller’s eponymity only to his/her provider – the identity of the caller is 
hidden to his/her provider, and (4) where caller’s eponymity only to callee’s provider 
– the identity of the caller is hidden to callee’s provider [41].  
In most cases, the anonymous system is divided into two classes. The first is 
an anonymous system with high latency and the second is a low latency anonymous 
network [42]. For instance, crowds is one of the high latency anonymous system, 
whereas, JAP, Tor, PipeNet, and Anonymizer are low latency anonymous systems. 
Below is a brief outline of the characteristics of high and low latency anonymous 
system. 
2.4.1 Crowds 
In 1998, Michael K. Reiter and Aviel D. Rubin introduced a new anonymity 
system for web transactions, called Crowds. The Crowds aims to protect users’ 
privacy when accessing websites; assuring web browsing anonymity, by preventing 
websites from identifying users by concealing each user as a member of the Crowds 
[41, 43, 44]. However, use of Crowds does not provide anonymity from global 
eavesdroppers [45] and nor can it defend against denial of service (DoS) attacks by 
rogue crowds members [46]. The basic idea of The Crowds is “blending into a crowd” 
– a web transaction will hide with other crowds members [46, 47]. Since then, the 
Crowds became one of references on anonymity system. Since its origination, Crowds 
has become a well-known anonymity system, and the Crowds concept can be 
understood by viewing the following figure. 
 




Crowds consist of client and servers as central crowds. All clients or nodes 
within in crowds are called “jondos”. The word “jondo” is derived from “John Doe” 
which emphasizes the anonymity of the network users [48, 49]. Each jondos is 
connected with a central server, where it receives a list of the crowds members. 
Maintaining anonymity in crowds, is achieved because each jondos forwards a web 
request from other randomly selected jondos in the crowds. That jondos sends the 
request  direct to the destination website or forwards it on to other jondos. In this last 
case, the step can be repeated by forwarding to the next crowd’s member (jondos). 
This method prevents an adversary, or even other crowds members from determining 
the identity of the origin initiator [46-48]. Once a path is chosen, all communication 
from the sender to the receiver will use that same path within a 24-hour period [44]. 
Messages between jondos are encrypted with private keys. A private key is created 
for each jondos when the jondos establishes a connection with the central server.  
2.4.2 Java Anon Proxy (JAP) 
Java Anon Proxy (JAP) also called JonDonym was developed under the 
auspices of a project under taken at Dresden Technical University, Regensburg 
University and Schleswig-Holstein Privacy Commission. JAP is a proxy system with 
a single static IP address used by many JAP clients/users. It makes web browsing 
untraceable. The idea of JAP is a Mixes network. An anonymous group provides a 
Mixes cascade run by independent organisations. This is different from peer-to-peer 
based anonymous networks, such as The Onion Routing (Tor) whose relays are 
themselves anonymous. Figure 2.10 shows entire anonymous service system used by 
JAP. The network consists of JAP (installed on the user’s computer), mix-server 
(anonymizing intermediaries), cache proxy, and an info service [50].  
Maximum anonymity in JAP is achieved if there are many JAP users on the 
cascade or JAP server. However, numerous users on a JAP server will decrease the 
bandwidth and transfer rate available for each user, meaning that the latency on the 






Figure 2.10 The concept of anonymous service [50] 
2.4.3 The Onion Routing (Tor) 
The Onion Routing (OR) research began in late 1995 at the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL) [52]. OR is a low-latency anonymous system that is resistant to 
eavesdropping and traffic analysis [53]. It aims to conceal communication between 
the sender and destination. The sender communicates with the destination via several 
routers. This means that the eavesdropper has no information about who is calling 
whom. 
 
Figure 2.11 Onion routing topology [54] [48]. 
At the beginning of the OR development, a single malicious relay on the OR 
network could record traffic between the initiator/sender and the destination/receiver, 
and may then use it to decrypt the traffic. Also at that time, the OR allowed 
intermediate relays to create their own onion routers to the next relay on the route, as 




[55]. In first-generation onion routing, it was necessary to acquire a separate proxy for 
each application [51]. Figure 2.11 illustrates the topology of an Onion Routing (OR). 
The Onion Routing (Tor) – the second-generation of OR – is a circuit-based 
low-latency anonymous communication service that only supports TCP streams over 
the Internet. It aims to thwart attackers from identifying single or multiple 
communication links to or from single user [51]. It is a Socket Secure (SOCKS) 
server supporting SOCKS 5, which hides the client from their destination. The Tor 
network has been added perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory 
servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and practical designs for 
location-hidden services via rendezvous points, when all features are not found by 
Onion Routing (OR). The Tor operates on the real-world Internet. It does not have a 
requirement for special privileges or kernel modifications, and require little 
synchronization or coordination between nodes, providing a reasonable trade-off 
between anonymity, usability, and efficiency [51]. Nowadays, Tor is a free software 
P2P network most widely used to achieve anonymity on the Internet [56]. It is the 
most popular anonymous communication network, and has an estimated over 500,000 
users, occupying more than 3000 network relays, and about 2000 MBps of total 
bandwidth in July 2013 [57, 58]. Furthermore, the Tor network is well supported by 
Tor project forum [59]. 
Tor encrypts data multiple times and it is decrypted as it travels over the 
network a layer at a time: much like peeling an onion [60]. Tor clients send data 
packets to volunteer proxy routers worldwide, to hide the location of the sender and 
the recipient from anyone conducting traffic analysis or network observations. 
The Tor client receives the relay list from the Tor directory server. It then 
selects three relays: an entry relay, a middle relay, and an exit relay in an 
unpredictable manner. Data from the sender will then be encrypted using a private 
relay key, as has been selected. The first data is encrypted using a key from the exit 
relay, then by using the middle relay’s key the last encryption is performed using the 
entry relay’s key. After this, data from the Tor client is sent to the entry relay. On 
arrival at the entry relay the data is decrypted using a private entry relay key. 
Therefore, on entering the relay, data is secured with two private keys (middle and 





middle relay, the data is decrypted using the middle relay’s key and then the data is 
transmitted to the exit relay. At the exit relay, the data is sent without encryption to its 
final destination. So the exit relay is the sender from the perspective of the actual 
destination (receiver). Figure 2.11 depicts Tor network architecture. 
 
Figure 2.12 Tor network architecture 
Tor is a network of volunteer-operated routers that enables users to 
communicate privately in the presence of eavesdroppers who have local (non-global) 
views of the Internet [61]. It maintains anonymity by selecting connection relays at 
random, and also replaces relay connections every 10 minutes.  
2.4.4 PipeNet 
PipeNet [62] was described by Wei Dai in 2000. It is a simple anonymous 
protocol that provides private protection against traffic analysis by anonymous packet 
forwarders. It uses three or four intermediate nodes to establish a connection between 
sender and receiver. The basic idea of PipeNet is a virtual link encryption. This 
establishes a rerouting pathway to deliver the packet [44]. 
PipeNet is similar to onion routing, and is a low latency anonymous system 
that heightens anonymity. It is an ideal anonymous architecture system. However, a 
single user is able to disconnect from the network by not forwarding messages [51]. 
In terms of implementation, PipeNet has never been deployed on a large scale 





Anonymizer [64] is a simple proxy-based service which uses a single 
centralised anonymous proxy; it acts as an intermediary and offers privacy protection 
for a client’s computer from the rest of the Internet. Therefore, it has a relatively low 
delay and also low anonymity level compare to sophisticated anonymous network; the 
end-to-end relationship is not anonymous with regard to Anonymizer itself [65]. 
Clients use Anonymizer for many reasons, such as bypassing censorship applied in 
some countries, preventing identity theft or protecting data when browsing the 
Internet.  
Unfortunately, at the moment, anonymizer servers are only available in the 
U.S. Therefore, latency is high for communication between continents such as 
communication between a caller in U.S and callee in Germany.  
2.5 Probability of Attackers 
Anonymity is an essential requirement for many applications, which are 
transferred to open network; Internet protocols. It protects the user's identity with in a 
variety of ways; in particular sender anonymity (protect the identity of the sender), 
receiver anonymity (protect the identity of the receiver) and relationship/unlinkability 
anonymity (protects the link between the sender and the receiver). 
Several papers have described the anonymity degree of anonymous network 
systems, such as the anonymity degree in MIX and Crowds network [66], peer-to-
peer networks (chord) [67], and anonymous communication systems [44]. In general, 
a degree of anonymity calculation is based on the Shannon Entropy. In 1948, Claude 
Elwood Shannon introduced Shannon entropy - a formula of probability in his journal 
“A Mathematical Theory of Communication” [68]. The anonymity degree calculation 
aims to determine whether the attackers can identify the initiator or sender of a 
message on the network. However, each anonymous system provides a different 
degree of anonymity and to measure the degree of anonymity is a complicated task. 
The formula for calculating Shannon Entropy is: 





Let X be the discrete random variable, 𝐻 𝑋  is entropy of X event and 𝑁 is 
the number of honest relays in the network (anonymity set), pi is the probability that 
the attacker will break anonymity. Let 𝐻! be the maximum of entropy for the system 
to be measured, 𝐻! can be calculated as: 
𝐻! = 𝑙𝑜𝑔!(𝑁)   (6) 
The attackers learns the possibility of attacking the system, and it can be 
expressed as the maximum entropy of the system (𝐻!) decreased by the entropy of 
the system after attacks (𝐻 𝑋 ). We can normalise the values by dividing by the 
maximum entropy (𝐻!). Afterwards, the degree of anonymity in the system can be 
defined as: 




   (7) 
The main question concerns whether the entropy model can be used to 
measure anonymity in the Tor network. According to Paul Syverson [69], the degree 
of anonymity in the Tor network cannot be measured using the Shannon Entropy 
method. This entropic method has failed to communicate capabilities to adversaries, 
regarding how much information can be acquired from the Tor network; thus, the 
entropic conception of anonymity leads to the assumption of an anonymous system 
and adversary model as irrational in practice [69]. Another reason for this is that the 
anonymity of the Tor network is difficult to measure using the entropy method 
because the actual number of Tor users in a certain time frame is unknown; such that, 
available information only estimates the number of Tor users. 
Defining the capabilities of an adversary is one of the challenges when 
designing anonymous communication systems. An adversary may be an observer 
capable of observing a connection incapable of initiating connections (e.g a sniffer on 
an Internet connection). Another adversary capability is as a disruptor; i.e. delaying or 
even corrupt traffic on a link. The adversary may also be a hostile user who initiates 
or destroys connections. The adversary controls relays (compromised relays) used as 
connections between the source and destination. It can manipulate the connections as 




The adversary on a Tor network is a compromised relay. The Tor network is 
particularly vulnerable to the Global Passive Adversary (GPA) [51, 70]. The GPA 
model can observe all traffic on a link in the system. Therefore, the capabilities of 
GPA are too strong for the Tor network to realistically handle attacks [69]. Therefore, 
we have assumptions about the adversary on the Tor network. The adversary on a Tor 
network should compromise all the relays on a network that connects the sender and 
receiver, then the adversary can know who is talking to whom (relationship 
anonymity). Therefore, if one of the relays used to connect the sender and receiver 
cannot be controlled by the adversary, then an anonymous Tor network is maintained. 
Figure 2.13 show the path link on the Tor network has been controlled by the 
adversary, 
 
Figure 2.13 The adversary controls the path link on the Tor network  
If we assume that attackers will know the original initiator/sender, original 
destination/receiver, and that they will also discover whether the sender and receiver 
are communicating between themselves, if the attackers take control of all the relays 
being used as a transmission media. Then the probability of attackers at the entry 
relays is !!
!!
, for subsequent relays, the attackers probability will be obtained by 
!!!(!!!)
!!!(!!!)
, so the probability of attackers on Tor network within two relays (𝑙 = 2) and 

























Where, 𝑃!! is the probability of attackers on a Tor network within two Tor 
relays, and 𝑃!! is the probability of attackers on a Tor network with three relays.  
Comparisons between the probability of attackers with two relays and three relays are 
described in chapter 4. 
2.6 Open Virtual Private Network (OpenVPN)  
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a network that uses a public 
communication network such as the Internet, to provide a secure network tunnelled 
through another network. VPNs are commonly used for implementing secure point-
to-point communications. In our experimentation, we use OV as a VPN. This has 
three functions, the first applies the OV as an encapsulation method; the OV uses TCP 
streams to transfer UDP streams over the Tor network. The seconds, OV is used for 
identification VoIP users (identity of VoIP users are OV’s IP address), and another 
function is that the OV uses an encrypted tunnel from sender to destination, thus 
communications have end-to-end security. 
2.6.1 Encryption 
VoIP over OV can insure security. OV uses the OpenSSL library to encrypt 
both data and control channels. All voice traffic is encrypted and then sent over the 
OV. The OV server and client will create an encrypted communication network 
(encrypted tunnel). After the tunnel has been established, the VoIP client will 
communicate with other VoIP clients through the encrypted tunnel. In this scenario, 
the VoIP client and the OV client will be on the same box/machine and the OV server 
will be installed on the VoIP server machine. 
2.6.2 Authentication 
Authentication in OV can be established in several ways, such as using pre-
shared keys and certificate-based authentication. Pre-shared secret key authentication 
has the benefit of simplicity, being the easiest authentication method in OV. 




it relies on RSA certificates and keys. It is built using OpenSSL command. It is 
included in OpenSSL distribution. Moreover, the common name and email address of 
the certificate holder is another field secured field by RSA certificates. 
2.6.3 Security 
VoIP over OV achieves 3 security goals. These are confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. 
Confidentiality – the data that is transferred over OV should only be available 
to the authorised person. Initially, when the OV server and the client were configured, 
both were supplied with each other’s keys. On the client side, there is the certificate 
from the server, the client’s certificate and a key. Hence, only a client with a 
certificate and a key can communicate with the OV server. 
Integrity – the data transferred must not be altered between the sender and the 
receiver. Since a secured tunnel is created, data transfer will not be affected. 
Availability – the data transferred must be available as needed. After a 
connection is established between the OV client and the server, data traffic can be 
transferred [71]. 
2.7 Time Series Analysis 
Forecasting is never accurate, but it is an important step to ensuring the 
continuity of activity as well as network planning.  One of the methods applied to 
predicting the future is time series analysis. A time series analysis is a method 
employed to predict an event by observing a response variable at regular time periods 
(e.g, hourly, daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly or annually) and variables measured 
over time should be sequential. A time series aims to acquire the expected patterns to 
predict the future events of the variables. 
Basically, time series data has three fundamental behaviours; these are a trend, 
seasonal, and random variation.  Trend shows the long-term movements in the data; 





population increases or decreases, change in incomes, development of technology, 
and/or changing consumer preferences.  Seasonal can be identified by analysing 
daily, weekly, monthly and even movements over multiple years in historical data. 
Patterns can be recognised when they repeat over time, such as transaction activities 
in a supermarket, restaurant, or daily traffic volume. Random variations refer to 
residual variations, which are unpredictable and difficult to identify; such as 
prediction of a major strike or a war. 
Various disciplines employ time series data as forecasting method, including 
mathematical statistics, finance, meteorology, communications and computer science, 
etc. In Tor network, forecasting uses the trends of time series analysis for predicting 
Tor network capacity, including Tor users, relays and bandwidth. In this research, Tor 
network forecasting was performed by applying a linear trend and three non-linear 
trends (quadratic, cubic and exponential). 
A linear trend is a simple function that forms a straight line based on historical 
data. A straight line is used to give future predictions and the line might then be a 
straight upward or downward line. In general, the form of a linear trend is as 
presented in equation 10. In some cases, time series data cannot be analysed by 
observing a linear trend; such cases occur because time series data initially has a 
different gradient with subsequent data. Thus, these cases are better analysed 
according to non-linear rather than linear trends. Below are the formulas for all non-
linear trends; formula 11 is quadratic, formula 12 is a general formula describing a 
cubic trend and formula 13 is an equation for an exponential trend.  
𝑇! = 𝑎 + 𝑏.𝑌!  (10) 
𝑇! = 𝑎 + 𝑏.𝑌! + 𝑐.𝑌!!  (11) 
𝑇! = 𝑎 + 𝑏.𝑌! + 𝑐.𝑌!! + 𝑑.𝑌!! (12) 
𝑇! = 𝑎𝑏!  (13) 
where,  
𝑇! = 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  𝑡; 
𝑎 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡  𝑜𝑓  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑎𝑡  𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑; 




𝑌! = 𝑎𝑛  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒); 
Accuracy and control of forecasting is important to minimise forecast error. A 
forecasting method can be selected by evaluating forecast accuracy using the actual 
time series data. The two commonly used measures to insure forecast accuracy are 
Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) and Mean Squared Error (MSE). Forecasting using 
the lowest values of MAD and MSE provides the best-forecast accuracy. According 










  (15) 
Where, 
𝑦! = 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎  𝑜𝑓  𝑎  𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛  𝑡𝑖𝑚e  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑; 
𝐹! = 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑑𝑎𝑡a  𝑜𝑓  𝑎  𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑; 
𝑛 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠  𝑜𝑓  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎; 
2.8 Current Attacks on Tor Network 
There are several common attacks that occur on an anonymous network, such 
as Denial of Services (DoS), replay attack, message coding attack, collusion attack, 
packet volume attack, packet counting attack, message delaying attack, flooding 
attack, intersection attack, and timing/latency attack [73]. In August 2013, the Tor 
network was used by the community to attack a target, the attack used was a BotNet 
attack. It is classified as a Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attack. 
BotNet is a combination of two words; robot (Bot) and network (Net); it is a 
malware-compromised machine, which is one of the most serious security threats. 
BotNets are used for various purposes [74]; either for legitimate or illegitimate 
activities. In the case of legitimate activities, botnets are used by several IRC bots that 
have been linked to and set the channel modes on other bots, leading users to protect 





are used to send spamming mails, stealing personal information, phishing, 
disseminating malware, and Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) injection [75]. 
Botnets are a collection of hundreds, and sometimes even thousands, of the 
compromised computers from independent networks controlled by a botnet originator, 
also known as a “bot herder”, or a “bot master”. In early August 2013, BotNet used 
Tor network to attack their target or their destination; therefore, the numbers of Tor 
users increased significantly from fewer than one million users to more than five 
million users. This resulted in the degradation of QoS across the Tor network. 
Latency in the Tor network also increased extremely, and this was very detrimental to 
VoIP users of the Tor network. 
2.9 Related Work 
Although there have been numerous research studies done on VoIP, there has 
been very limited research into how to anonymise VoIP over Tor. Liberatore et. al. 
[32]  investigated the quality of service performance on anonymous VoIP (aVoIP). 
The aVoIP [32] proposes a means to provide user privacy in VoIP. It has a similar 
architecture to the Tor network, but it uses UDP instead of TCP. Thus, aVoIP can be 
called “Private Tor”. 
aVoIP is installed and tested on a large distributed overlay network, 
PlanetLab.  PlanetLab is a platform spread throughout the continent that are used to 
perform test-bed operations and deployed for large-scale networks. aVoIP 
experiments were performed with 40 proxies in Asia, 49 proxies in America and 121 
proxies in Europe. Their experimental results showed that quality of calls with proxies 
was at a level of 46% acceptability in Asia, 71% in Europe and 86% in America [32]. 
This aVoIP research described how many relays or proxies were used, but did not 
mention the total number of aVoIP users or the bandwidth provided by “Private Tor”. 
Therefore, the researchers do not know the ratio between users, relays/proxies and 
bandwidth. 
TORFone was designed to communicate voices via the Internet (make a call). 




It is an open source project, so there is no “backdoor” and bugs are found and 
fixed immediately. TORFone is decentralised; therefore, it does not require an 
external server or identity to register (username or number). TORFone’s developer 
claimed that it provides full confidentiality by using the Diffie Hellman key exchange 
method with 4096 bits and voice traffic is secured using encryption method AES-256-
OCB; it also uses PKDF2+HMAC for authentication. Thus, the attackers cannot listen 
to a conversation unless they can access participants’ computers. Implementation of 
TORFone results in up to 2-4 seconds of voice latency, because voice traffic will pass 
through several relays located around the world [76]. 
Another anonymous VoIP based on the Tor network is the 1985phone. In June 
2013, the 1985phone concept was presented by Jonathan Corbett [77]. It is a peer-to-
peer protocol. The 1985phone concept was similar to the Tor concept in that the voice 
traffic data is transferred via several relays before reaching the destination. 
1985phone users were to become relays for the other users. Therefore, the biggest 
challenge in the implementation of this concept is the limitation of resources, such as 
the lack of batteries, mobile phone capabilities, and also limited bandwidth for data 





3 RESEARCH METHODS 
As validity and consistency are required when conducting research, a number 
of orderly steps were designed to meet these requirements. The research methodology 
used in this dissertation is based on an empirical research template. Empirical 
research is a class of research methods in which empirical observations or data are 
collected to answer a particular research question. While primarily used in academic 
research, it can also be useful for answering practical questions. The aim of this 
empirical study was to investigate the QoS performance of VoIP in the anonymous 
network – The Onion Routing (Tor). 
This chapter discusses how research was conducted to gather relevant data 
according to research objectives, in order to answer the research questions stated in 
Chapter I. In this chapter, the researcher will discuss the approach to the research, the 
research design, instruments, data collection procedures, and the data analysis 
processes.  
3.1 Research Approach 
The research approach in empirical research can be divided into two categories 
of methods, i.e. quantitative research and qualitative research. The quantitative 
research approach involves collecting data in number form and using statistical 
modelling for data analysis. While, the qualitative research approach involves 
collecting qualitative data such as text, image and sounds with observations, 
interviews, and documentary evidence [78].  
The most common quantitative approaches are experimental, survey or 
historical data. In experimental research, the researcher applies a treatment and then 
measures the results (before and/or after) of this treatment. This method can be used 
to demonstrate a casual relationship between variables. Alternatively, survey research 
commonly utilizes a set of questions to be asked in a face-to-face interview, using the 




the research respondent. Historical data uses existing data, which is then analysed in 
order to have a pattern in historical data [78].  
The most common qualitative research methods are case study and action 
research. A case study is the collection of observational data in a real world setting, 
such as on a software development project. While action research is the 
implementation of the research idea in practice, evaluation of results, and 
modification of the idea (a combination of an experimental and a case study) [78]. 
This research uses empirical research methods employing both approaches – 
qualitative research and quantitative research approaches. Experiments, action 
research and historical data have been used to gather the data and analyse results. 
Experiments and action research have been conducted in two scenarios and over three 
different periods of time. Historical data was also used for Tor network forecasting. 
The details of experiments and action research are presented in the research design. 
3.2 Research Design 
The research focused on VoIP over the Tor network, referring to relays used 
only in Europe. Experiments and action research were conducted in two network 
scenarios. These were VoIP calls experiment, through a Tor network with three relays 
and VoIP calls through a Tor network with two relays. The experiments were 
conducted in December 2012, July and October 2013. Both scenarios used OpenVPN 
which encapsulates UDP and TCP, so that audio packets can be transmitted over the 
Tor network. The detailed architecture of the experimental scenario can be seen in 
figure 3.1. 
 





One hundred calls were placed to acquire the results for each scenario at 
different periods of time during the experiment. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 depict Tor 
network architecture with three and two Tor relays.  
 
Figure 3.2 Architecture of Tor network with three relays 
 
Figure 3.3 Architecture of Tor network with two relays 
Figure 3.4 illustrates Alice’s communication with Bob through pipeline multi 
layers; the first layer is a pipe for OpenVPN (OV). In this pipeline, UDP is wrapped 
with TCP; thus, the RTP packets can be transmitted through Tor network. OV 
connects Alice and Bob with a private key held by them alone. This ensures the end-
to-end security of the communication between them. The second to fourth pipes are 
the Tor network with three relays and each Tor relay has a private key. Using a Tor 
network communication between Alice and Bob will be anonymous, because each 
relay only knows where the messages come from, and where the messages are sent 
(not a real sender and receiver). 
The differences between a Tor network using three relays and one using two 
relays are the number of pipe layers that encapsulate the UDP packets. When using 




relays there are three pipe layers. Figure 3.5 shows Alice’s communication with Bob 
using OV through two Tor relays. 
 
Figure 3.4 VoIP over VPN through three Tor relays 
 
Figure 3.5 VoIP over VPN through two Tor relays 
3.3 Instruments 
In this research, two computers were used as VoIP and OpenVPN clients, and 
one computer was a VoIP and OpenVPN server. Tor relays in Europe were selected 
with a bandwidth of more than 2 MBps (high bandwidth).  
Specifically, two computers used as VoIP clients, had an Intel quad core 
processor Q8300 (2.5 GHz) with 4 GB RAM (memory) and Intel Core 2 Duo (2.4 
GHz) with 5 GB RAM (memory). Meanwhile, the other computer, which was used as 
a VoIP and OpenVPN server had an Intel Pentium 4 (3 GHz) with 4 GB RAM 
(memory). 
The software used during this research was the Tor client, Privoxy, Network 
Time Protocol (NTP), OpenVPN server and client, PhonerLite as VoIP client, Zaitun 
Time Series (ZTS). We modified the relays with Tor open source code. 
Vidalia 0.2.15 as a Tor client that was installed onto the computer to connect 
the VoIP client with the global Tor network. The Tor client acquired a list of Tor 
relays from the Tor directory server. This meant, the Tor client could randomly select 





SOCKS5 proxy serving as an intermediary for any application to the Tor network. 
Socket Secure (SOCKS) proxy is an open source socket, which in this setup served as 
a tool for transferring applications that enable communication with the global Tor 
networks. Figure 3.6 depicts the connection between the VoIP client and the Tor 
network. 
 
Figure 3.6 Relationship between VoIP client and Tor network 
Privoxy is free software and licensed under the GNU GPLv2. It is a SOCKS 
proxy application that supports SOCKS4 and SOCKS5. It connects the OV client with 
the Tor client. Privoxy’s  other functions include: capabilities in advanced filtering to 
enhance privacy, modifying http headers and web pages, controlling access and 
removing ads, and other internet junk. Privoxy’s configuration is flexible and can be 
customised according to need, and can also be used as stand-alone or multi-user 
network [79]. 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) is a protocol used to synchronise the time on 
the Internet network. In early 1980, David Mills developed NTP, which has become 
an Internet standard. The latest NTP standard is the IETF standard, which is set forth 
in RFC 5905. The latest NTP guarantees the potential accuracy to the tenth of a 
microsecond in modern network technology with modern workstations and fast LANs 
connections [80]. It uses Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) to synchronise clock 
time. Time accuracy on a network is important in situations, such as air traffic control 
that require accuracy to the microsecond, and in communication systems that need 
accuracy in terms of time to calculate latency in the network.  
Currently Tor networks only transfer TCP in stream-based forms, and in 
general, audio packets in real-time communication are using UDP stream. Therefore, 
we cannot directly transmit audio packets over the Tor network. There are several 
ways to transmit voice packets via the Tor network. One of these is by using 




has the capability of covering UDP with a TCP stream. In this way, the VoIP client 
can communicate with other VoIP clients using a direct method call. The virtual IP 
address of the OV client is used as the identity for the VoIP client. Another advantage 
of using OV in this research is the addition of end-to-end security, because of the 
AES encryption method used in the virtual network communication between OV 
clients.  
PhonerLite is a free softphone made by Heiko Sommerfeld, which is easy to 
use and user friendly. And also, Phonerlite already support many voice codecs such as 
GSM, G. 711, Speex and iLBC. It can be used for peer-to-peer VoIP calls that IP 
address used as users identity. Currently, Phonerlite can only run on Windows 
operating system, and it currently supports encryption methods such as Transport 
Layer Security (TLS), Secure Real Time Protocol (SRTP), and the Zimmermann Real 
Time Protocol (ZRTP) [81]. Figure 3.7 shows PhonerLite. 
 
Figure 3.7 PhonerLite – VoIP client 
Wireshark was used to capture audio packets on the sender and receiver ends. 
Wireshark is free and open source software that is useful as a network analyser. The 
original version of Wireshark was known as Ethereal; however, due to a trademark 
issue, Ethereal was renamed Wireshark in May 2006. Currently, Wireshark is used in 
various sectors, such as, education, network analyser, network troubleshooting, and 
communication protocol development. In terms of functionality, Wireshark works 
much like tcpdump; however, it has a graphical front-end and is integrated with 
additional options, such as packet filtering [82]. Figure 3.8 which follows, is a 






Figure 3.8 The Wireshark Network Analyzer 
For Tor network forecasting, Zaitun Time Series Analysis software was used 
to predict the future of the Tor network. It is free open source software designed to 
statistically analyse time series data. It was developed by students at Statistics 
Institute of Indonesia [83].  
3.4 Data Collection Procedures 
Experiments on VoIP calls over Tor networks were tested over three periods - 
December 2012, July 2013 and October 2013. These calls were tested during the 
weekday from 9 am to 5 pm. Voice packets were captured 5 minutes after each test. 
We collected the VoIP packet timestamp on the sender and receiver end. Network 
Time Protocol (NTP) was used in this research to establish time accuracy between the 
sender and receiver.  
The Tor client was reset for each new VoIP call in order to obtain different 
relays for each call. Therefore, the path connections used for each call experiment 
differed from one another. The relays used were randomly selected by the Tor client 
which was installed on the sender. 
Voice packets were captured with Wireshark at the sender and the receiver 
ends. Then, the data obtained was used to calculate latency on the network. Voice 
packets, which had latency exceeding the provisions of the ITU, i.e. more than 400 




calculate the jitter. In each experiment, a time a call was made and the relays used for 
the path connection was recorded.  
3.5 Data Analysis Procedures 
In this research, data analysis was conducted to compare the experimental 
results for each period and analyse the possible causes of variations in the results. 
Raw data obtained from Wireshark was used to calculate QoS performance in VOIP 
through the Tor network. Three QoS metrics were calculated – latency, jitter and 
packet loss. Latency in the network is obtained from packet time as it arrives at the 
receiver, decreased by packet time transmitted in the sender. Furthermore, average 
jitter is derived from the variation of latency for each audio packet sent, and packet 
loss can be obtained if the latency of the packet exceeds the permitted latency of 400 
ms.  
Statistical analysis procedures were used for prediction about the Tor network 
prior to December 2013. Four methods of analysis were used in a time series; 
reporting linear, quadratic, cubic and exponential trends. Mean Absolute Deviation 
(MAD) and Mean Squared Error (MSE) were used to insure accurate forecasting. In 
theory, the time series method with the smallest values for MAD or MSE is the 
method with the highest accuracy in the real data. These data analysis procedures 
were presented in detail in chapter 4, in the section detailing the results and analysis 
of Tor forecasting.  




4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The objectives of this chapter are to analyse and interpret the data collected in 
the empirical experiment to answer the research questions given in chapter 1. This 
chapter presents the findings obtained from the VoIP calls over the Tor network with 
three and two Tor relays and a discussion of Tor network forecasting, and the 
probability of attackers.  
4.1 VoIP over Tor Network 
In this research, VoIP calls were conducted over the Tor network with two 
scenarios; i.e. VoIP over a Tor network with three relays (default Tor network) and 
VoIP over a Tor network with two relays. Experimental data were collected in three 
time periods; in December 2012, July 2013, and October 2013 on weekday, between 
9 am and 5 pm. A hundred calls were captured for each scenario and each of the calls 
lasted five minutes. 
The experiments for VoIP over a Tor network with two relays has the 
advantage of a lower latency compared to that over three Tor relays, because 
implementing VOIP over two Tor relays may shorten the length of the voice packets 
route. 
In December 2012, the average total numbers of relays on the Tor network 
numbered 2,978; from these 177 relays in Europe with a bandwidth of more than 2 
MBps were selected. By comparison, in July 2013, there were 3,965 relays on the Tor 
network; from these 231 relays in Europe with a bandwidth of more than 2 MBps 
were selected. By, October 2013, the total number of Tor relays was 4,453 relays; 
from these 298 relays in Europe with a bandwidth of more than 2 MBps were 
selected. The total bandwidth of the relays captured (or measured) in December 2012 
and July 2013 was more than 900 and 1,300 MBps respectively. Meanwhile, the 
bandwidth of the relays measured in October 2013 reached 1,500 MBps. These results 
indicated that the total number of relays and bandwidth within the different periods 
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had undergone a significant increase. Specifically, the overall relays went up by 30% 
in 7 months, while the number for total bandwidth also rose by 44% over the same 
period.  
Of the average Tor users, in December 2012, there were 802,243 users, and in 
July 2013 the Tor users declined slightly to 785,903 users. Meanwhile in October 
2013, the average number of Tor users increased drastically compared to that over the 
two previous periods. In this period, the number of Tor users exceeded four million. 
The increasing number of average Tor users was not proportional to the increase in 
the number of relays or bandwidth over the experimental periods. Table 4.1 shows the 
details of Tor network conditions in December 2012, July 2013 and October 2013. 
Table 4.1 Tor network condition 
Tor network condition Dec. 2012 Jul. 2013 Oct. 2013 
Average number of Tor relays 2978 3965 4453 
Average estimate number of Tor users 802,243 785,903 4,753,768 
Average total Tor bandwidth (MBps) 2,143.08 2,553.85 2,661.23 
Relays with > 2MBps in Europe 177 231 298 
Total bandwidth of relays in use (MBps) 965.66 1,391.19 1,550.63 
4.1.1 Three Tor Relays 
This research measured three metrics of QoS, namely latency, jitter and packet 
loss. Wireshark was used to capture the audio packets at the sender and receiver ends. 
The qualities of VoIP calls were considered acceptable if they met the requirements of 
VoIP recommendation, which included the following criteria: less than 400 ms 
latency, up to 30 ms jitter and less than 5% packet loss. VoIP calls with three Tor 
relays were made in December 2012, July 2013 and October 2013. 
According to the experiment with VoIP calls with three Tor relays conducted 
in December 2012, 36% acceptable calls at a 5% packet loss and 21% acceptable calls 
at 1% packet loss were acquired. Average latency obtained on these experiments was 
137.55 ms and 156.98 ms for 1% and 5% packet losses. Meanwhile, the result for 
average jitter obtained for 1 up to a 5% packet loss differed slightly by less than 1 ms. 
Table 4.2 below shows the details of the VoIP call experiments performed in 
December 2012 using three Tor relays. 




Table 4.2 The experimental results for December 2012 using three Tor relays  
Tolerated packet loss 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
Acceptable quality calls (%) 36 33 30 24 21 
Av. Latency (ms) 156.98 153.72 152.69 145.17 137.55 
Av. Jitter (ms) 15.46 15.03 15.15 15.13 14.97 
Hundreds of calls were also collected using the three Tor relays in July 2013. 
The results of the experiment in this period show 20% to 38% acceptable calls for 1% 
and 5% packet loss. The average obtained for 5% and 1% packet loss was 157.16 ms 
and 138.93 ms. The average jitter obtained for each packet loss (1% up to 5% packet 
loss) indicates a slight difference, ranging between 18-20 ms. Table 4.3 shows the 
details of the experimental results for July 2013. 
Table 4.3 The experimental results for July 2013 with three Tor relays 
Tolerated packet loss 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
Acceptable quality calls (%) 38 34 31 28 20 
Av. Latency (ms) 157.16 155.14 154.5 144.96 138.93 
Av. Jitter (ms) 18.58 18.97 19.22 18.82 19.23 
The results obtained from hundred VoIP calls in October 2013 were 11% and 
24% acceptable calls with 1% and 5% packet losses. The experiment resulted in an 
average latency of 179.96 ms at 5% packet loss and 135.23 ms at 1% packet loss. 
Average jitters in this experiment were 18.59 ms and 17.51 ms at 5% and 1% packet 
loss. Detailed results for the VoIP calls experiments in October 2013 are presented in 
table 4.4 below. 
Table 4.4 The experimental results for October 2013 with three Tor relays 
Tolerated packet loss 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
Acceptable quality calls (%) 24 20 19 15 11 
Av. Latency (ms) 179.96 169.25 166.93 143.09 135.23 
Av. Jitter (ms) 18.59 18.04 17.94 17.26 17.51 
The results of the VoIP call through three Tor relays show the best results 
were obtained in July 2013. In this period, the highest number of acceptable calls was 
38% at 5% packet loss; this is followed by results for December 2012, when there 
were 36% calls with 5% packet loss. The experimental results for October 2013 
returned the worst results for the three different periods. This was because the number 
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of Tor users in October 2013 was the highest for the three periods of data collection 
(experiments). The increase in Tor users in this period was very significant.  
In October 2013, Tor network had more than four million users on average. 
Whereas, in December 2012 and July 2013, there were fewer than one million users. 
The number of average Tor relays in October 2013 was 4,453 relays. In fact, this 
number represents an increase in the average number since Tor relays in July 2013, 
when there were 3,965 relays. Meanwhile in the first experimental periods, the total 
average number of Tor relays was just 2,978 relays. The average bandwidth in 
October 2013 increased slightly compare to that in July 2013, which ranged from 2.55 
to 2.66 GBps. In December 2012, the average bandwidth was just 2.14 GBps. Table 4 
shows a comparison of the Tor network conditions within the three experimental 
periods. The details for acceptable calls, latency and jitter in the three periods of the 
experiment are shown in figures 4.1 to 4.3. 
Based on the Tor network conditions and the results of the experiments in the 
three different periods, it is apparent that a significant increase in number of Tor users 
took place in October 2013; this was not accompanied by a significant increase in the 
total amount of bandwidth and so may consequently result in high latency on the Tor 
network. These conditions are unfavourable for VOIP users who use the Tor network 
to make anonymous calls. 
 
Figure 4.1 Acceptable quality calls with three Tor relays 





Figure 4.2 Average latency of “good” calls with three Tor relays 
 
Figure 4.3 Average jitter of “good” calls with three Tor relays 
4.1.2 Two Tor Relays 
The second scenario is VoIP over two Tor relays. Modifying the number of 
Tor relays as a medium for transferring voice packets from three relays to two relays 
will provide lower latency. However, using two relays instead of three can reduce the 
degree of anonymity. Experiments on two Tor relays were performed at the same time 
of day as experiments with three Tor relays, i.e. in December 2012, July 2013 and 
October 2013. 
The experiments were conducted in December 2012, resulting in 36% 
acceptable calls at 1% packet loss and 54% calls at 5% packet loss. The average 
latency for 1% packet loss was 98.83 ms, while that for 5% packet loss was 122.90 
ms. Average jitter for 1% and 5% packet loss was in the range of 13 to 16 ms. Table 
4.5 shows the details of experimental results in December 2012. 
Table 4.5 The experimental results for December 2012 with two Tor relays 
Tolerated packet loss 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
Acceptable quality calls (%) 54 50 48 44 36 
Av. Latency (ms) 122.90 117.08 110.71 103.55 93.83 
Av. Jitter (ms) 15.83 15.45 15.14 14.85 13.87 
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Furthermore, the results of the experiment performed in July 2013 show there 
were 65% acceptable calls with 5% packet loss, but only 45% acceptable calls were 
obtained with 1% packet loss. Next, the average latencies acquired for 1% and 5% 
packet loss were 100.01 ms and 117.70 ms respectively. Finally, the average jitter 
obtained for 1 up to 5% packet loss ranged from 13 to 16 ms. Table 4.6 below 
provides the details of the experimental data on VoIP over the two relays captured in 
July 2013. 
Table 4.6 The experimental results for July 2013 with two Tor relays 
Tolerated packet loss 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
Acceptable quality calls (%) 65 64 59 51 45 
Av. Latency (ms) 117.70 117.34 109.94 103.95 100.01 
Av. Jitter (ms) 15.45 15.45 15.08 14.43 13.62 
In the study conducted in October 2013, it was found that there were 28% 
acceptable calls at 5% packet loss and 19% calls at 1% packet loss. Further analysis 
of the data reveals the average latency for acceptable calls was 5% and 1%, and 
packet losses were 120.94 ms and 92.25 ms. Regarding jitter, the experimental data 
shows that the average jitter obtained range from 15 to 17 ms. The results of the 
experiment for the second scenario in October 2013 returned the worst results for all 
scenarios in all time periods. Similarly, in the first scenario the worst results also 
occurred in October 2013. Table 4.7 presents the details of the experimental result 
with the second scenario in October 2013. 
Table 4.7 The experimental results for October 2013 with two Tor relays 
Tolerated packet loss 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
Acceptable quality calls (%) 28 24 22 20 19 
Av. Latency (ms) 120.94 107.15 98.23 94.44 92.25 
Av. Jitter (ms) 16.10 16.24 15.87 15.60 15.29 
In comparison, the experimental results of the second scenario were the same 
as the results for the first scenario, in which the best results were those for July 2013. 
These experimental results indicated there were 54% acceptable calls in December 
2013, 65% calls in July 2013 and only 28% calls in October 2013, with  5% packet 
loss. The average latency in December 2012 amounted to 122.90 ms for 5% packet 
loss and 93.83 ms for 1% packet loss. The average latency obtained for the 
experiment in July 2013 amounted to 117.70 ms, obtained for 5% packet loss and 




100.01 ms for 1% packet loss. Meanwhile the average latency in October 2013 was 
120.94 ms for a 5% packet loss and 92.25 ms for a 1% packet loss. For average jitter, 
there was little difference in each experimental period which ranged from 13-16 ms. 
A comparison of the results obtained from the experiments on VoIP over two Tor 
relays in December 2012, July 2013 and October 2013 are shown in figures 4.4 to 4.6.  
 
Figure 4.4 Acceptable quality calls with two Tor relays 
 
Figure 4.5 Average latency of “good” calls with two Tor relays 
 
Figure 4.6 Average jitter of “good” calls with two Tor relays 
The QoS comparison for the first and the second scenarios revealed that VOIP 
for two Tor relays delivered a better QoS than VoIP for three Tor relays. This applies 
to all time periods. 
The experiment on VoIP with two relays, which was performed in December 
2012, shows 54% acceptable calls for 5% packet loss, while the results obtained for 
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the VoIP experiment over three relays performed in the same period showed 36% 
acceptable calls. Likewise, for average latency, using two Tor relays as a medium 
transmission gained low latency compared to the three Tor relays. The average 
latency with three Tor relays was 156.98 ms for 5% packet loss, whereas using two 
Tor relays results in a slightly lower figure of 122.90 ms for the same packet loss. 
Average jitter obtained for VoIP over two and three relays showed only a little 
difference, ranging between 13 and 16 ms. Comparative results for the two scenarios 
in December 2012 can be seen in figures 4.7 to 4.9. 
 
Figure 4.7 Acceptable quality calls in December 2012 
 
Figure 4.8 Average latency of “good” calls in December 2012 
 
Figure 4.9 Average jitter of “good” calls in December 2012 
In July 2013, the experimental results showed that VoIP over two Tor relays 
had a significant number of acceptable calls compared to that over three Tor relays.  
Acceptable calls obtained for the second scenario numbered 65%, while the 




alternative scenario only led to 38% calls at 5% packet loss. For average latency, it 
was found that the average latency of the two Tor relays was lower by 40 ms than that 
for the three Tor relays. At 5% packet loss, VoIP with three Tor relays had 157.16 ms 
of average latency, and 117.70 ms when using two Tor relays. The differences in 
average jitter in both scenarios average 5 ms. Average jitter obtained for both 
scenarios ranged between 13 and 19 ms. Figures 4.10 to 4.12 show the details of the 
experimental results, for tests conducted in July 2013. 
 
Figure 4.10 Acceptable quality calls in July 2013 
 
Figure 4.11 Average latency of “good” calls in July 2013 
 
Figure 4.12 Average jitter of “good” calls in July 2013 
The results of the experiment performed in October 2013 revealed that VoIP 
over two Tor relays led to more acceptable calls than the alternative scenario. At 5% 
packet loss, it had 28% calls and VoIP over three Tor relays led to only 24% calls. 
Average latency at 5% packet loss was 179.96 ms using the default Tor network and 
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120.94 ms using two Tor relays. Whereas, average jitter for both scenarios was 
around 14 to 19 ms. The details of the experimental results for October 2013 are 
shown in figures 4.13 to 4.15. 
 
Figure 4.13 Acceptable quality calls in October 2013 
 
Figure 4.14 Average latency of “good” calls in October 2013 
 
Figure 4.15 Average jitter of “good” calls in October 2013 
The results for the experiment performed in October 2013 revealed the worst 
results compared to those for December 2012 and July 2013. In mid-August 2013, the 
Tor network received Botnet attacks, which led to an extraordinary increase in the 
number users; the number of users increased eight fold compared to July 2013. Total 
users per-day increased from mid-August 2013 until October 2013, exceeding more 
than four million. However, relays and bandwidth only increased slightly. The 
tremendous growth in the number of Tor users led to overloaded bandwidth at each 




Tor relay which caused high latency on the Tor network greatly affecting the QoS 
performance of VoIP over the Tor network. 
In this research, the experimental results were unsatisfactory, such that the best 
results were in July 2013 with only 65 calls of 100 calls tested, thereby meeting the 
requirements of the VoIP standard. This condition a consequence of multiple factors, 
one of these was Tor relays condition used to connect the caller and callee. The Tor 
relays conditions when conducting the experiments were unknown. This is due to 
security reasons, since providing information on relays conditions can increase the 
possibility of an attacker using relays condition information to attack the Tor network. 
Thus, a VoIP user on a Tor network does not know the condition of the Tor relays in 
the pathway; i.e. whether the Tor relays have enough bandwidth to transfer the audio 
packet or whether the relay usage has already been exceeded (overload). 
4.2 Tor Network Forecasting 
Tor network forecasting was conducted in early August 2013. Four time series 
analysis methods were used for Tor network forecasting, namely: linear, quadratic, 
cubic, and exponential trend. The data used for the Tor network forecasting was 
obtained from www.metrics.torproject.org [57] and included users, relays and 
bandwidth data from 1st January 2012 to 31st July 2013. Two methods were used to 
determine which forecasting methods had best accuracy; the Mean Absolute 
Deviation (MAD) and Mean Squared Error (MSE) calculation. The smallest values 
for MAD and MSE obtained from the forecasting method were considered to be the 
best for forecasting accuracy. 
Figure 4.16 shows the details of the Tor users forecasting. From this graph, it 
can be seen that according to the two forecasting models (linear and exponential) Tor 
users were expected to increase at the end of 2013. On the contrary, the quadratic and 
cubic forecasting method show that there will be a reduction in the number of Tor 
users by the end of 2013. In fact, forecasting with a cubic model returned the lowest 
MAD and SSE thus it appears to be the best method for forecasting Tor user numbers. 
The details MAD and SSE are shown in table 4.8. Based on forecasting results, it can 
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be concluded that the number of Tor users is expected to reach between 400 thousand 
to one million users by the end of 2013.  
 
Figure 4.16 Tor users forecasting 
Table 4.8 Users of Tor network accuracy 
Tor users forecasting accuracy 
 Methods Linear Quadratic Cubic Exponential 
MAD 41,259 37,767 33,110 43,099 
MSE 2,778,415,742 2,390,678,338 1,932,286,675 3,013,107,630 
Figure 4.17 shows the details of the Tor relays forecasting data, which 
indicates an increase in the average number of Tor relays at the end of 2013 for each 
forecasting method. However, extreme increases in the average number of Tor relays 
was indicated by the cubic forecasting method. Based on the result of the MAD and 
MSE, the best forecasting method, i.e. that which most closely approaches accuracy, 
is the cubic method then followed by the quadratic method. According to the cubic 
prediction, the number of Tor relays is expected to reach about 6,000 by the end of 
2013. In contrast, the cubic method predicts there will be more than 4,500 Tor relays 
by the end of December 2013. Whereas, the estimations for the other two forecasting 
methods (linear and exponential) are almost similar to those for the quadratic, as they 
predict the number of Tor relays will be around 3,900 – 4,000 relays. The details for 
the accuracy of the supposed average number of Tor relays accuracy is shown in table 
4.9. 





Figure 4.17 Tor relays forecasting 
Table 4.9 Relays of Tor network accuracy 
Tor relays forecast accuracy 
 Methods Linear Quadratic Cubic Exponential 
MAD 126 106 46 121 
MSE 25,138 16,305 3,499 23,241 
By the end of 2013, all four forecasting methods predict that Tor bandwidth 
will have been increased. The highest bandwidth prediction was returned by the cubic 
forecast method; it reached almost 3.5 GBps. In contrast, the lowest prediction was 
returned when using quadratic forecast method, in which the bandwidth was only 
about 2.7 GBps. The details when forecasting the Tor relays can be seen in figure 
4.18. Forecasting accuracy is shown with the lowest values for MAD and MSE, as is 
indicated by the cubic forecast method, which returns the lowest value for both 
accuracy methods (MAD and MSE). Table 4.10 shows the results of the forecast 
accuracy method for the four forecasting methods. 
 
Figure 4.18 Tor bandwidth forecasting 
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Table 4.10 Bandwidth of Tor network accuracy 
Tor bandwidth forecast accuracy 
 Methods Linear Quadratic Cubic Exponential 
MAD 62.77 63.12 58.47 67.07 
MSE 6,137.39 6,024.68 5,367.65 7,358.20 
4.3 Tor Network Forecasting Validation 
Tor network forecasting was performed in July 2013. There were three Tor 
network components forecasted, namely: Tor users, relays, and bandwidth. In mid- 
January 2014, researchers validated the results of Tor network forecasting. This was 
to determine whether the forecast results approached or were in accordance with the 
actual data. Forecasting was done to predict the three Tor network components in the 
period August to December 2013. The Tor network forecasting validation is presented 
in the graph from January to December 2013. 
Figure 4.19 to 4.21 shows the validation results for the Tor network 
forecasting. It can be seen that the forecasting validation of Tor users deviates from 
the forecast results. This is because there were unexpected events beginning in early 
August 2013 (as stated above, the BotNet community used the Tor network as a 
medium to attack their targets). Therefore, the numbers of Tor users in August 2013 
exceeded two million users, peaking in September 2013, at which point there were 
nearly six million users. After this, the number of Tor users slowly decreased until the 
end of 2013 when it approached three million users. Tor network forecasting took 
place in July 2013, and all four methods predicted the numbers of Tor users would 
only approach one million users by the end of December 2013. The details of the Tor 
user forecasting validation are presented in figure 4.19. 





Figure 4.19 Tor users forecasting validation 
Figure 4.20 shows the Tor relays forecasting validation. At the end of 2013, 
the number of Tor relays reached more than 4900 relays. As mentioned previously, 
the most accurate forecasting method was cubic, since it had the lowest MSE and 
MAD value. The forecasting results returned by this method estimated that there 
would be more than six thousand relays by the end of December 2013. Thus, the total 
of over 4900 is close to the predicted result obtained using the quadratic method. The 
results of the forecasting validation for the Tor relays are shown in figure 4.20 in 
detail. 
 
Figure 4.20 Tor relays forecasting validation 
Tor forecasting in July 2013 shows the cubic method was the best forecasting 
method for predicting the growth of Tor bandwidth. Based on the forecast results, by 
the end of December 2013, the Tor bandwidth was 3200 MBps and in reality the 
actual Tor bandwidth found by the end of December 2013 perfectly match cubic’s 
prediction. 
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Based on Tor network forecasting, we found that the growth in number of Tor 
users was extreme, while the growth in Tor relays and bandwidth was not 
proportional to the increase in Tor users. This impacted on the QoS performance of 
VoIP over the Tor network. This was indicated by the results of experiments 
conducted in December 2012, July, and October 2013. In October 2013, Tor users 
numbered above four million and the number of Tor relays had slightly increased, but 
bandwidth had decreased over the period of the experiment. 
 
Figure 4.21 Tor bandwidth forecasting validation 
4.4 Tor Relays Condition 
The QoS of VoIP over the Tor network is inseparable from the condition of 
the relays which is used as a link between the sender and the receiver. The condition 
of each relay is used as a link to transfer the audio packet, but which must not be in 
the overloaded bandwidth. If there are one or more relays with the overloaded 
bandwidth, there will be a delay or latency caused by the queuing packets. This delay 
is usually called a queuing delay. The delay varies but is generally not advantageous 
for VoIP users who require end-to-end latency in a network of less than 400 ms. This 
condition will be difficult to achieve if the Tor relays have an overloaded bandwidth. 
The results for good latency and jitter from the experiment in July 2013 are shown in 
figures 4.22 and 4.23. The results of these experiments show an average latency of 
about 200 ms with a 0% packet loss and an average jitter of about 18 ms. 
Figures 4.24 and 4.25 show bad latency and jitter resulted from one of the 
experiments conducted in July 2013. The average latency obtained in this experiment 




exceeded 400 ms and the peak of the packet latency reached nearly 4,000 ms. Based 
on these figures, it can be ascertained that the audio packets from the sender will 
involve a long delay before they reach the receiver. The figures also show the packet 
loss on this experiment exceeded 50%, with an average jitter of less than 30 ms. This 
means the audio quality was good, but that there was a long delay between sender and 
receiver. 
 
Figure 4.22 Good latency in experiment 
 
Figure 4.23 Good jitter in experiment 




Figure 4.24 Latency on bad QoS calls in the experiment 
 
Figure 4.25 Jitter on bad calls in the experiment  
4.5 Probability of Attackers 
Attacker probability measurements aim to discern the probability of attackers 
according to the experimental scenarios, which were VoIP calls over two Tor relays 
and VoIP calls over three Tor relays. Based on the results of the experiments, it 
appears that VoIP calls through two Tor relays provide better performance than VoIP 
calls over three Tor relays. Attackers probability on the Tor network is described in 
section 2.5. 
Currently, Tor users have already exceeded one million users, and the Tor 
network has more than 5,000 relays scattered around the world. Therefore, for 
attacker probability we assume that the number of Tor relays is 5,000.  





Figure 4.26 Attackers probability of Tor network 
With a very large numbers of Tor relays and path lengths used, the attackers 
probability is very small. Figure 4.26 shows the attacker probability between VoIP 
calls with two Tor relays and three Tor relays. Based on the results for these 
calculations, the probability of attackers on the Tor network with two relays is nearly 
0.2, and the compromised relays are about 40%. However, the probability of an 
attacker is the same as three relays will be effected when number of compromised 
relays is about 60%. Based on these results, we can be infer the level of attackers 






5 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter, the researcher present a conclusion to the study based on the 
research finding. The research will also include recommendations for future work and 
challenges.  
5.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation, which is based on empirical research, aims to obtain the 
value of QoS performance in VoIP over a Tor network. In summary, the present study 
has proven that although the Tor network is not designed to transfer audio packets in 
real time, it was capable of transmitting audio packets with reduced positive results in 
terms of QoS.  
Furthermore, four fundamental research questions are fulfilled. In regard to the 
first research question, this research has shown that VoIP can be integrated with the 
Tor network by means of encapsulation. By doing so, the audio packets (UDP stream 
based) can be transmitted over the Tor network (TCP stream based). In this research, 
the audio packets were encapsulated by using openVPN. Communications between 
the caller and callee via OV include peer-to-peer communication, which is a virtual IP 
address for their identity. 
The second question is the main research question. After integrating VoIP 
with the Tor network, the QoS performance when of anonymising VOIP was 
calculated. The best QoS performance for VoIP over Tor network were the 
experimental results for July 2013, when 65% of calls were acceptable, and the worst 
result was in October 2013, when only 24% of calls were acceptable for a 5% packet 
loss. These results were not good, when compared to the QoS performance of PSTN, 
which reached 99.999%. 
Tor is designed to assure the anonymity of data packets being sent from the 
sender to a destination. Existing anonymity on the Tor network is guaranteed by 





there are eavesdroppers who capture a data packet they still do not know the sender or 
receiver’s identity. By default, three Tor relays are used as a pathway to connect the 
sender and receiver. Each Tor relay has a private key using a 128 bits Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) encryption; thus, the security on each relay is maintained. 
The Tor network does not have end-to-end security, because the data from the exit 
relay to the destination is sent without encryption. 
The Tor network is a low latency network designed to disperse data such as 
email, chat, and websites. By using TCP, the Tor network sends data without errors. 
The Tor network is not suitable for real time communication, because it has no 
guarantee of latency. According to ITU standard requirements, latency on audio real 
time communication should be not more than 400 ms (one way latency). Based on the 
research results, it is found to be difficult to acquire a good QoS performance on VoIP 
over a Tor network if there is insufficient bandwidth. This is apparent from the results 
for each experimental period. If the ratio of Tor bandwidth and Tor users average is 
high, then acceptable calls will return good results. Thus, the limitations of VoIP over 
the Tor network describe the Tor network conditions, such as the number of Tor users 
and Tor bandwidth (to have good quality calls) and number of relays (to achieve a 
good anonymity). 
Currently, the Tor network is reliable, trustworthy, and updated periodically. 
By using the Tor network, VoIP users can engage in anonymous communication. 
However, selecting high anonymity levels results in a degradation of QoS 
performance in VoIP over the Tor network. This was proven by the experimental 
results, in which three Tor relays were found to have higher anonymity than two Tor 
relays; although the QoS performances for three Tor relays as much lower than for 
two Tor relays. Due to the Tor network’s anonymous connections, on August 2013, 
the BotNet community began using it to attack their target. This led to a sudden and 
dramatic increase in the number of Tor users. In July 2013, there were about 900 
thousand users on the Tor network, but in August 2013, Tor users numbered over five 
million. 
Although Tor has not been designed for transmitting voice, this research has 




recommendations (G.114). In addition, our research also quantifies the trade-off 
between call quality and the probability of attackers. 
5.2 Future Work 
This dissertation is based on empirical research. It has limitations, such as the 
fact that many of the components of the Tor network (numbers of users, numbers of 
relays, and bandwidth) cannot be adjusted. The researcher was only able to 
investigate the relays to be used as a pathway in the experiment. This means that the 
researcher only used the data acquired during the periods when the experiments were 
conducted. 
This research focuses on a QoS performance analysis of VoIP over the Tor 
network. In the future, research could be done to analyse the QoS performance in 
VoIP on other anonymous networks; such as VoIP over JAP/ANON, Crowds, P5, and 
Anonymizer and/or building an anonymous network specifically for VoIP. 
This research could also be followed by integration of an encapsulation tool 
with the VoIP client. Therefore, in the future, OpenVPN will no longer be required, 
because the VoIP client will be able to use Tor client identity for the VoIP dialling 
process. This will result in full anonymity in VoIP calls, because there is no third 
party acting to support communication between the caller and callee. 
Currently, the Tor network does not implement a minimum limit on bandwidth 
usage; therefore, if Tor user numbers increase, then the bandwidth will be shared 
equally among all Tor users. This may then lead to a drop in the quality of the Tor 
network. Thus, the Tor network should prioritise existing users when bandwidth is 
overloaded, by limiting the minimum bandwidth dedicated to Tor users. The Tor 
network could then reject new users when the limit for minimum bandwidth has been 
reached. In this way, the Tor network could maintain the necessary QoS to support 
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